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High rates of inflation during the past
decade have increasingly focused the attention
ofpolicy makers and the general public on the
importance of bringing the monetary aggreg-
ates under control. The Federal Reserve
System now has an official goal of slowly
reducing growth rates in the monetary aggreg-
ates over the next few years in order to lower
rates of inflation gradually. Since October
1979, the Fed has attempted to improve
monetary control by focusing its short-run
operations on achieving targets for bank
reserves, and by letting the Federal-funds rate
vary more widely than previously had been the
1 case.
Despite these procedural changes, the
monetary aggregates gyrated widely in 1980,
and were significantly above or below the
Fed's longer-run targets at various times dur-
ing the year. This paper discusses a monthly
money-market model which provides an
explanation for the surprisingly high variability
ofmoney in 1980. The model shows how cer-
tain types of financial-market disturbances,
such as sharp changes in bank loans, can affect
the money supply and thus cause problems of
monetary control. The evidence indicates that
large swings in bank loans, induced primarily
by the Special Credit Control Program, were
the major source of money's variability in
1980.
This explanation has no role in conventional
models, which view the supply of deposits as
being determined by the public's demand,
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given short-term rates ofinterest, income and
prices.
2 With a conventional model, unex-
pected movements in the monetary aggregates
often reflect changes in the past relationship
between the public's demand for money and
its determinants - that is, reflect a "shift" in
the demand function for money. There is little
doubt, in retrospect, that such a downward
shift occurred in 1975-76, when historically
high interest rates induced the public to
economize on money balances.
3 In far greater
doubt, however, are assumed subsequent
"shifts" ofshorter duration, such as the one in
the second quarter of1980. The present paper
argues that the rapid monetary deceleration in
the second quarter of1980 (as well as the rapid
growth in the first and third quarters) was
caused, not by a money-demand shift, but by a
money-supply "shock" induced by changes in
bank loans. This is a crucial distinction for
policymakers. A downward shift in the
demand for money makes a given money sup-
ply more expansionary. Thus the appropriate
policy is to lower the money supply. On the
other hand, a downward money-supply
"shock" for a given demand for money makes
policy more contractionary. Thus the appropri-
ate policy response is to offset the money-sup-
ply "shock" through faster growth in bank
reserves.
Whereas conventional models emphasize
the demand for money, the model in this paper
emphasizes the supply of money, with banks
playing an important role in determining that
supply. In particular, it explicitly incorporates
bank loans and banks' management of non-
deposit liabilities into the determination of
transaction deposits.
4 In this approach, banks
maximize profits by satisfying the public'sdemand for loans with funds raised with the
least costly mix ofmanaged liabilities (such as
large certificates of deposit and repurchase
agreements). The outcome of this process is
an aggregate "supply" oftransaction deposits,
which varies inversely with the Federal-funds
rate and directly with the commercial-paper
rate and with bank loans.
The model treats money as a buffer stock in
the public's portfolio. Loan-induced increases
in the money supply thus exert an especially
powerful impact on the monetary aggregates in
the model. When the public demands addi-
tional bank loans, it temporarily absorbs the
deposits that are created in the process without
significant interest-rate changes in the short-
run: Le., money-supply shocks induced by
bank-loan movements can put the market for
money into temporary disequilibrium. This
means that changes in bank loans have a large
short-run effect on the public's money hold-
ings and a relatively small effect on interest
rates.
The model therefore provides a theoretical
rationale to explain why changes in the supply
ofmoney can dominate short-run movements
in the monetary aggregates. The empirical sec-
tion provides three pieces of evidence consis-
tent with this hypothesis. They involve the
speed with which banks adjust reserves when
interest rates change, with the contribution
that bank-loan changes make to explaining
movements in money, and with the extent to
which money-supply shocks temporarily shift
the public's demand curve for money.
Section I ofthe paper describes the theoreti-
cal model. Here we show how the model deter-
mines the stock of transaction deposits, total
reserves, and the Federal-funds and commer-
cial-paper rates. Section II reports the results
ofestimating the model onlunar-monthly data
(four-week blocks) for the sample period July
1976 to September 1979. This section also
considers the results of simulating the model
both over the sample period and out ofsample
over the post-October 1979 period - the
period marked by the Federal Reserve's adop-
tion of a new reserve-operating procedure.
Section III uses the simulation results to assess
the cause of the volatility in the monetary
aggregates in 1980. Section IV summarizes the
conclusions and the policy implications of the
model.
I. Theoretical Model
The model is designed to analyze the
behavior of the commercial banks, nonbank
public and Federal Reserve in the markets for
transaction deposits and bank reserves. Thus
the primary variables determined by the model
include the stock of transaction deposits and
the commercial-paper rate in the deposit
market, and the stock of reserves and the
Federal-funds rate in the reserves market. The
underlying characteristics ofthe model are de-
scribed in three distinct stages, which are sum-
marized in Table 1. Each stage includes the
preceding stage(s), so that by stage 3, the
model is complete. A formal specification of
the model is presented in Appendix A.
Stage 1 analyses the markets in which com-
mercial banks sell nondeposit liabilities (such
as large certificates of deposit and repurchase
agreements) to the nonbank public. As shown
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below, demands for and supplies of these
instruments - expressed as functions of own
and substitute yields as well as the sizes of the
banks' and public's portfolios - are sufficient
to determine the banking system's mix of
liabilities between deposits and nondeposits.
The level ofdeposits implied by this mix con-
stitutes the banking system's "supply" of
transaction deposits. Note that in Stage I, the
"supply" ofdeposits is defined as a function of
the Federal-funds rate, and therefore abstracts
of conditions in the market for reserves.
Stage 2 introduces the Federal Reserve by
adding to the analysis the market for bank
reserves. The banking system's desired mix
between nondeposit liabilities and deposits
determined in Stage I, together with the
reserve-requirement ratios on these categories
ofbank liabilities, define the banking system'sdemand for total reserves. The supply of
reserves comes from 1) the amount ofborrow-
ing from the Federal Reserve, and 2) the
amount of nonborrowed reserves supplied by
the Fed. The additionofthe supply ofreserves
allows the reserves market to clear at
equilibrium values of the funds rate and total
reserves. In Stage 2, both the reserves and
nondeposit-liabilities markets clear. Hence the
supply ofdeposits at this stage is consistent not
only with the banks' preference among
liabilities, but also with the banks' and the
Fed's desired level and composition of
reserves.
Stage 3 introduces the public's demand for
transaction deposits. The interaction of this
demand with the supply of deposits deter-
mined in Stage 2 completes the solution ofthe
model. Here it is not strictly accurate to speak
of market equilibrium because the market for
deposits allows for short-run disequilibrium.
Nevertheless, since the model defines the
source and size ofthat disequilibrium, the de-
posit market can determine the stock of de-
posits and the commercial-paper rate. The
remainder of this section describes each stage
in more detail.
Stage 1: Nondeposit Liabilities
The analysis begins with the description of
the portfolio behavior of an individual bank
(Figure 1). A minimum ofseven categories of
bank assets and liabilities is necessary to
preserve the model's usefulness as a founda-
tion for empirical research. These categories
are total reserves, R; bank loans, BL; private
transaction deposits (including demand, ATS
and NOW accounts), DB; other deposits (pri-
marily small time and savings), TB; managed
liabilities less security holdings, 1MB; 5
member-bank borrowing, RB; and net Federal
funds purchased and repurchase agreements,
FFIRP. The last three items together con-
stitute what we call nondeposit liabilities.
The short-run problem of a representative
bank involves financing a given stock ofloans.
Banks consider loans to be exogenous on a
monthly basis, because the short-run demand
is relatively interest inelastic - and because
banks often respond sluggishly in altering their
loan rates when their marginal costs of funds
change, waiting for signs that such cost
changes are not transitory.
Part of the bank's loan portfolio is financed
by transaction and other deposits, which it
Table 1




Variables or Relations Variables
Solved For Affecting Solution
Stage I Banks' nondeposit
liabilities
Stage 2 Bank reserves
Stage 3 Transaction
deposits
1. Banks' supplies of
nondeposit liabilities







































iv) Personal incomeregards as exogenous in the short run. The
bank adjusts implicit deposit rates sluggishly
- as it does the loan rate - viewing thequan-
tity ofdeposits in the short run as being essen-
tially determined by the public's demand.
Banks must finance the excess of loans over
deposits by selling nondeposit liabilities to the
public. The individual bank's short-run
portfolio choice involves choosing the struc-
ture of nondeposit liabilities - among 1MB,
FFIRP and RB.
The bank's portfolio choices are the out-
comes of maximizing expected profits subject
to the balance-sheet constraint. In the very
short run, only 1MB, FFIRP and RB can be
adjusted. The factors influencing expected
profits include, among other things, the
explicit interest costs of each of three liability
items - the rate on longer-term managed
liabilities (such as CDs), denoted by io; the dis-
count rate, iB; and the Fed-funds rate, iF. As
well, expected profits depend on the risk and
liquidity characteristics ofassets and liabilities,
so that the marginal returns or costs of each
portfolio item include a marginal non-interest
element in addition to the explicit interest
cost. 6 For example, banks' borrowings from
the Federal Reserve depend not only on the
discount rate, but also on banks' traditional
"reluctance to borrow" from the Fed. Given
these variables - as well as the (exogenous)
size ofthe portfolio to be financed, (BL + R -
DB - TB) - individual banks sell optimal
quantities ofIMB, FF/RP and RB to the non-
commercial-bank sectors.
The quantities ofthese instruments actually
observed depend on the interaction of the
banks' supplies ofvarious types ofnondeposit
liabilities with the nonbank public's demands
for them. The latter depends upon relative
yields and other characteristics (e.g., risk) of
the bank and nonbank assets in the public's
portfolio, together with the overall size ofthat
portfolio. 7
The interaction between the banks and the
nonbank public in the markets for banks' non-
deposit liabilities is critical to the model,
because equilibrium in these markets deter-
mines the "supply" ofdeposits created by the
banking system. Equilibrium is depicted in
Figure 2 by the curve EQ. This curve repre-
sents all combinations of the funds rate and
bank nondeposit liabilities (IMB + FF/RP)
which are consistent with equilibrium between
the banks' supplies of and the public's
demands for 1MB and FF/RP (for expositional
purposes we assume that RB = 0).
Movements along EQ are determined in the
following manner. Assume that the funds rate
rises. Since banks consider FF/RP a substitute
for 1MB as a source offunds, they will respond
by raising their offer rates on IMB.
8 Since rates
on both 1MB and FF/RP have risen, the pub-
lic's demand for the total ofthose instruments
would also have risen, with the net inflow of
funds having been drawn from nonbank
instruments (such as commercial paper),
whose rates had not increased. Thus an
increase in the funds rate induces an increase
in io, which results on balance in a rise in
banks' total nondeposit funds.
The increased purchases of 1MB + FFIRP
extinguish demand deposits as the public
draws down its checking accounts to pay for
them. This process ensures that the banks' bal-
ance sheets will be in equilibrium. If banks
attract more nondeposit funds, their need for
deposits decreases, given the size of the loan
portfolio to be financed. The destruction ofde-





Representative Bank Balance Sheet
Depos.its and Nondeposit Liabilities
R Transaction deposits
Other deposits
BL Managed liabilities less security holdings








Equilibrium in the Markets for
Banks' Nondeposit Liabilities
IMB+FF/RP
deposits ensures that the new mix ofliabilities
is consistent with the banking system's
portfolio needs. Thus the combination of EQ
- which describes the nondeposit funds sup·
plied by the public for each level of the funds
rate - and the bank's portfolio constraint
implicitly defines the stock ofdeposits which is
consistent with both the banks' and public's
preferences for nondeposits.
The combinations of iF and DB that satisfy
both EQ and the bank's portfolio constraint
constitute the Stage 1supply ofdeposits (DB
S
_
1). A higher funds rate leads to fewer deposits
being supplied. This occurs because the inflow
of nondeposit funds to banks resulting from
the funds-rate increase causes banks to
extinguish deposits as their need for them de-
clines. DBs. 1 is also a function of the nonfi-
nancial commercial-paper rate (representing
the rate on the public's nonbank instruments)
and the banking system's portfolio scale varia-
ble, BL + R - TB (referred to as SCALE
below).
DBs-l is positively related to the nonfinan-
cial commercial-paper rate, which means that
its curve shifts to the right when icprises. The
public regards commercial paper as a
substitute for bank liabilities like RPs andlarge
CDs. Hence a rise in the paper rate will reduce
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the public's demand for bank nondeposit
liabilities as they shift funds into commercial
paper. Banks will respond by raising offer rates
on nondeposit liabilities, but this will be
insufficient to stem completely the exodus of
funds. As a result, banks will endup supplying
more transaction deposits, which they create
as they buy back managed liabilities from the
nonbank public.
A rise in SCALE also shifts DBs-l to the
right. A rise in bank loans, for example,
increases the size of the portfolio banks must
finance, with a consequent increase in SCALE.
For given iF and io, the amount ofnondeposit
liabilities is fixed by the public's demand for
these liabilities. Consequently, the supply of
bank deposits must increase by the increase in
loans ifrates are not to change. These deposits
constitute the proceeds of loans, which are
spent by the initial borrower and flow into the
accounts of his suppliers, employees and the
like.
Stage 2: Reserves
The deposit-supply function of Stage 1 was
defined as a function ofthe funds rate. In Stage
2, we add the reserves market; this determines
the funds rate along with a more comprehen-
sive definition of the supply of deposits,
denoted DBs ·2, which includes the influence
of the Federal Reserve's conduct ofmonetary
policy.
The right-hand diagram of Figure 3 shows
DBs_l from Stage 1. In the left-hand diagram,
Rdplots the amounts of required reserves the
banking system would need to hold for each
point on DBs_I. This will depend upon the
required-reserve ratio for transaction deposits.
(For expositional purposes, only transaction
deposits are considered reservable.) The
higher the level of transaction deposits sup-
plied, the larger are required reserves. Hence
lower funds rates, which are consistent with a
larger quantity ofdeposits supplied, are in turn
associated with a greater need or "demand"
for reserves. The graph of all such combina-
tions of funds rates and required reserves
therefore can be thought of as defining the
banking system's demand function for
reserves, depicted in Figure 3 as Rd.The description of the factors determining
the total amount of reserves available - the
supply of reserves - is conditional on the
Federal Reserve's choice of operating. pro-
cedure. We assume the current procedure,
whereby the Federal Reserve determines a
target for nonborrowed reserves; in Figure 3
one such target is illustrated by the vertical line
RU*.
Total reserves available can be larger than
RU*. Banks may borrow reserves from the
Federal Reserve on a temporary basis, instead
of borrowing in the Federal-funds market.
Consequently, a higher funds rate leads banks
to switch from the Fed-funds market to the
Federal Reserve's discount window, adding to
the aggregate stock of reserves in the system.
The amount borrowed will also depend on the
discount rate (iJ, the rate charged by the Fed
for such borrowing. At funds rates below the
discount rate, banks have little incentive to
borrow, so that total reserves are roughly equal
to nonborrowed reserves (this accounts for the
vertical portion ofRsbelow the "kink" at iF =
iJ. But as the funds rate rises- above the dis-
count rate, banks respond to a profit incentive
and expand their borrowing from the Fed.
However, the amount of this borrowing is
limited by the banks' reluctance to borrow,
which effectively determines the slope ofRSat
funds rates above the kink. Since the reluc-
tance to borrow tends to rise as the level of
Figure 3







26borrowing rises, R S becomes more steeply
sloped at higher funds rates. 9 In Figure 3, dis-
count-window borrowing as a function of the
funds rate is added to the nonborrowed-
reserves target to obtain total reserves availa-
ble, orwhat we call reserves supply, Rs.
The interaction ofreserves supply, reserves
demand and DBs_l determine market-clearing
levels for the funds rate, total reserves and the
Stage 2 supply of deposits (DB
S-2). As noted
earlier, DBs-l is defined for different funds
rates, whereas DBs _2 is co-determinedwith the
funds rate for any given level of the Federal
Reserve's monetary-control instrument. Point
A in the upper two graphs of Figure 3 illus-
trates the determination of DB at stage 2 for
the case in which the Fed uses nonborrowed
reserves as its instrument. 10
The movementfrom A to Bshows the effect
on Stage 2 DB of an increase in the commer-
cial-paper rate. As seen from the discussion of
Stage l, a rise in the commercial-paper rate
shifts DBs-l to the right. This shift, shown in
the NE diagram ofFigure 3, is associated with
an increase in the demand for reserves in the
NW diagram. The increased demand for
reserves puts upward pressure on the funds
rate. Hence the increase in icp causes both
iF and DB to rise from A to B. Levels ofStage 2
deposits are plotted against the commercial-
paper rate in the SE diagram, and denoted by
DB
s-2.
An increase in the Federal Reserve's non-
borrowed-reserves operating instrument
causes DBs-2 to rise. For example, a larger
stock ofnonborrowed reserves puts downward
pressure on the funds rate. As a result, bor-
rowed reserves fall, offsetting part of the
increase in RU. In addition, the lower funds
rate induces banks to cut the rates they pay on
other nondeposit liabilities, so that the public
reduces its holdings of these instru-
ments, causing banks to create more deposits.
The net effect in the reserves market is a
movement down along the R d curve, with a
lower funds rate and a higher level of total
reserves. In the deposit market, the Stage 2
supply curve shifts to the right. For any given
commercial-paper rate, a lower funds rate
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induces a lower equilibrium quantity ofIMB+
FFIRP, and thus a larger supply ofdeposits.
An increase in bank loans also has a positive
effect on DBs _2. When bank loans rise, banks'
managed liabilities and deposits rise at
unchanged interest rates: i.e., both Rd and
DBs _2 shift to the right. The increased demand
for reserves causes the funds rate to rise, as
banks are "forced" to the discountwindow for
a larger quantity of reserves when nonbor-
rowed reserves are held constant. The higher
funds rate eliminates part of the increase in
banks' reserves demand and deposit supply,
but on balance both quantities rise.
Note that the influence ofbank loans on de-
posit supply depends heavily on the behavior
of the Federal Reserve. If, for example, the
Fed held the funds rate constant in the face of
an increase in bank loans, the partial offset of
the increase in DB
s_2 could not occur. As a
consequence, the impact of a bank-loan
increase would be larger than in the case where
the Fed held nonborrowed reserves constant
and allowed the funds rate to rise. By an
analogous argument, the Fed could reduce
nonborrowed reserves to such an extent that a
change in bank loans would have no influence
on the quantity of deposits supplied.
Stage 3: Transaction Deposits
Only in the last stage is the public's demand
for transaction deposits introduced. This
demand is used in conjunction with the Stage 2
deposit supply to solve for the commercial-
paper rate and the stock of transaction de-
posits. The model allows for the possibility of
market disequilibrium by distinguishing two
concepts ofdeposit demand. Thefirst - short-
run equilibrium demand - is the conven-
tional relationship in which deposit demand is
a function ofshort-term interest rates, income
and lagged deposits. We include lagged de-
posits in this function to allow for incomplete
adjustment of the public's demand in the
short-run to changes in interest rates and
income.
Conventional practice treats this short-run
equilibrium demand as equal to the actual
stock of deposits: Le., it views the public as
always being on its demand function. The pre-sent model, however, allows for temporary
disequilibrium in the deposit market, in which
the commercial paper rate does not adjust to
make the actual stock equal to the short-run
equilibrium demandat each momentoftime.II
Actual deposits are therefore identified with
the second concept ofshort-run demand - the
disequilibrium demand for deposits. This
differs from its equilibrium counterpart to the
extent that market disturbances originating in
certain types of shifts in the Stage 2 money
supply temporarily force the public off the
equilibrium demand curve. This approach
makes an important distinction between the
demand for money and the demand for credit.
Changes in the quantity of bank loans, for
example, are assumed to be in accordance with
equilibrium in the bank-loan market.
However, these loan changes have an impor-
tant by-product: the creation or destruction of
deposits. Since changes in credit demand are
not necessarily associated with equal changes
in deposit demand, the public ends up tem-
porarily holding deposits it does not want: Le.,
it only accepts the deposits because this is a
necessary part of accepting the credit it does
want.
The important question is whether the pub-
lic remains in disequilibrium for a long enough
time to permit this effect to show up in
monthly observations. The persistence ofdise-
quilibrium will depend, in part, upon the size
of transaction costs involved in adjusting
money balances to desired levels, and will vary
among classes ofdepositors. Transaction costs
may be relatively small for large businesses,
who have at their disposal a number of highly
liquid financial instruments (e.g., repurchase
agreements) with which to adjust deposit hold-
ings. In contrast, households and others could
face relatively large transaction costs. Inflows
of "unwanted" deposit balances do not lead
them to make immediate portfolio adjust-
ments by the full amount necessary to restore
equilibrium.
Disequilibrium in the deposit market could
persist longer than it takes an individual de-
positor to adjust to desired balances. One de-
positor's equilibrium may be another deposi-
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tor'sdisequilibrium. To the extent that deposi-
tors reduce their unwanted balances by
purchasing goods and services and securities
from other members ofthe public, the latter's
deposit balances may exceed desired levels.
This process of spending and respending per-
sists until the unwanted deposits are "sold"
back to banks for nondeposit liabilities (reduc-
ing deposit supply) and/or income and prices
rise enough (raising deposit demand) to
restore equilibrium to the deposit market.
Finally, the actions" of the Federal Reserve
can significantly influence disequilibrium in
the deposit market. Ifthe Fed moves RU so as
to peg the funds rate, for example, it would in
effect allow the full impact of bank-loan
changes on deposit supply to be felt in the de-
posit market. If, on the other hand, the Fed
hits its nonborrowed reserves targets and lets
the funds rate vary, the impact of bank loans
on deposit-market disequilibrium will be
muted. Furthermore, under such a reserves-
control procedure, the Fed could be an impor-
tant source of disequilibrium itself. Assume,
for example, that the Fed exogenously
increased total reserves in excess of required
reserves. Banks might lend out these excess
reserves by purchasing Treasury securities
Figure 4
Effect of Deposit Supply "Shock"
on Observed Deposits
DBfrom the public. The Treasury-bill rate would
fall enough to induce the public to sell bills,
but the associated increase in deposits (i.e.,
the proceeds of the bill sales) would not
necessarily be demanded in the equilibrium
sense in the short-run. The deposit market
would be in (temporary) disequilibrium to the
extent that this occurs.
The process by which bank loans influence
the deposit market is illustrated in Figure 4.
The curve DB
d denotes the short-run
equilibrium demand for deposits as a function
of the commercial-paper rate, icp, with
nominal income, Y, held constant. A decrease
in bank loans is illustrated by aleftward shift in
the deposit-supply function by the horizontal
distance, IlDB
s
• This disturbance causes the
public to end up holding fewer deposits than
the equilibrium-demand curve would indicate.
In the short-run, icp and DB
d move from point
A to point B rather than to the point C indi-
cated by the equilibrium-demand function. At
point B, DB
s differs from DB
d by somefraction
It of the initial DB
s "shock". This dise-
quilibrium reduces interest-rate variability in
response to deposit-supply disturbances such
as changes in bank loans. (The same may also
be true for changes in nonborrowed reserves
when they are a source ofdeposit-market dis-
turbances.) Graphically, the process of the
move back to equilibrium can be thought ofas
made up of 1) movements along DB
s as
interest rates adjust,.and 2) leftward shifts in
DB
d (shown by DB
d
) as income and prices
change until equilibrium is reached at D.
The theoretical model is completed with the
addition of descriptions' of the public's
demands for currency (C) and other deposits
(TB) as functions ofincome, the commercial-
paper rate and other variables. These equa-
tions will be described in more detail in the
next section.
II. Empirical Model
We summarize the empirical version of the
theoretical model in Table 2, and report the
corresponding estimation results in Table 3.
(Appendix B contains a glossary of variable
names.) The empirical version of the model
recapitulates, with modifications, the theoreti-
cal model, but it also includes additions to ex-
plain other components of MIB besides
demand deposits, and to account for the other
important uses of reserves besides those held
against demand deposits and nondeposit
funds. (A fuller accounting for the uses of
reserves, along with a more complete descrip-
tion of some of the modifications discussed
below, can be found in Appendix C). But more
importantly, the empirical model includes
modifications to the core equations dictated by
the fairly complex structure ofreserve require-
ments in the real world.
Two of the equations from the theoretical
model carryover with minor changes. They
are the banks' aggregate demand for reserves
against demand deposits and nondeposit
funds, denoted RA and described in equation
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(2.1), and the banks' demand for borrowed
reserves described in equation (2.3). Reserves
demand now includes the discount rate, iB,
which had previously been assumed to be con-
stant, and the reserve ratio against nondeposit
liabilities, rio which had been assumed to be
zero. Equations (2.1), (2.3), the specification
of the Federal Reserve's supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves (equation (2.11)) and the sup-
ply of deposits (2.12) together constitute the
empirical version of Stage 2 of the model,
which is used to solve for the funds rate, the
quantity ofreserves, and DB
s
- 2.
The empirical counterpart ofStage 3 is used
to solve for the commercial-paper rate and the
quantity ofdemanddeposits. This version con-
sists of the public's demand for demand de-
posits, equation (2.5), and the corresponding
supply ofdemand deposits (DB
S
- 2). The lat-
ter relationship is where the empirical version
departs most significantly from the theoretical
model.
In the theoretical discussion, the derivation



















Supply of Nonborrowed Reserves
RU = RUOF*, Rd)
RU = RU'
Banks, Thrifts and Public
Identities
DB= MULT. RAt+v,= O!(rD + rl(LTBIDB»)RA1+v,
R= RA + rDDBGt_ l12 + rT(SBt-il2 + STBt_il2 + OCDBt_ I12 ) + RTH + RE
- + + + ......
RA = RA OF' icp , iB, SCALE, rD , rl)
- ? -
DB/RAt+v, = MULT(rD , rl, SCALE, (LTB/DB)t_l)
- + +
DBd= DBd(licp , IY, .6.BL)
MIA = DB + C




RB = RBOF, iB, ARU, RBt_ l)
OCD = OCD(OCDt_ 1' OCDt_ 2 , OCDt_ 3)
OCDB = OCDB(OCDBt_ l , OCDBt_ 2)
+ +
SB = SBOcp , Y, DUM(.), SBt_ l )
+ +
STB = STBOcp , Y, DUM(.), STBt_l)
Description
(2.1) Banks' demand for
reserves
(2.2) Banks' demand for
reserves (two week lag)
(2.3) Borrowing from Federal
Reserve
(2.4) Multiplier
(2.5) Public's demand for
demand deposits
(2.6) Public's demand for
savings deposits
(2.7) Public's demand for
small time deposits
(2.8) Public's demand for
currency
(2.9) Public's demand for
checkable deposits
at banks
















(2.18) Treasury deposits at
commercial banksreserves-demand function was simply multip-
lied by the inverse of the required-reserve
ratio against demand deposits. This approach
implicitly assumed that changes in deposits
were fully reflected contemporaneously in
reserves, and that only demand deposits were
reservable. In the real world, neither is true.
With lagged reserve accounting, changes in
deposits do not show uf in reserves demand
until two weeks later.
1 Even with monthly
data, reserves of the current month only
partly reflect contemporaneous deposit
changes. The full effect ofdeposits shows up in
reserves centered two weeks later: i.e., in the
average of the last two weeks of this month
and the first two weeks ofnext month. Clearly,
if we want to predict deposits from reserves,
we must use this measure of reserves, i.e.,
reserves shifted forward half a month.
Hence, two estimates of reserves demand
are needed for the empirical model. The first,
RA or contemporaneous reserves, is used to
explain the funds rate, and is described by
equation (2.1). The second, RAt+ l12, or
reserves shifted forward half a month, is used
to predict the supply of deposits for Stage 2,
and is described by equation (2.2). To make a
uniform two-week lag from deposits to
reserves, we must respecify all of the data in
the model in lunar months offour weeks each.
Predicting the multiplier is also no longer
trivial. The complication arises not because
nondeposit funds are reservable, but because
the requirement is not uniform across all types
of such funds. Consequently, the average
reserve-requirement ratio is a function not
only ofthe split between demand deposits and
nondeposit funds, but also ofthe allocation of
the latter among reservable and nonreservable
categories. As a result, the arguments of RA,
which explain the split only, are not
necessarily suited to predicting the average
reserve-requirement ratio and hence its
inverse, the multiplier. Preliminary estimation
indicated that the SCALE variable of RA (a
measure of the aggregate size of banks'
portfolios) helped to explain the multiplier,
but that the interest-rate arguments of RA
(the funds rate, the commercial-paper rate and
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the discount rate) did not. Since large CDs
(LTB) accounted for almost all of the reserve
requirements against nondeposit funds, we
used the lagged ratio of large CDs to demand
deposits to help predict the multiplier, as
shown in equation (2.4). We then multiplied
this prediction by RAt+1/2 to obtain the de-
posit-supply function for Stage 2.
Estimation Results
All equations were estimated in seasonally-
adjusted lunar-monthly observations (four-
week periods) from 1976:Lunar 8 (begins July
21, 1976) through 1979:Lunar 10 (ends Octo-
ber 3, 1979). The ending date coincided with
the Federal Reserve's adoption ofa monetary-
control procedure which focuses primarily on
reserves in day-to-day operations. We chose
the beginning date to avoid entangling the
estimation ofthe model with the bias inherent
in the (mid-1974 to mid-1976) shift in money
demand. (Now that the model has been esti-
mated over a fairly "clean" sample period, we
are working to extend the sample back to
1973.)
We aggregated seasonally-adjusted weekly
figures (where available) to give lunar-month
observations, or interpolated where only
calendar-month data were available. Both the
funds rate and commercial-paper rate are
endogenous in the model, so that we used two-
stage least squares wherever these rates
appeared as explanatory variables in a regres-
sion equation. Even though the funds rate was
a policy variable under the Fed's pre-October
1979 operating regime, it was not strictly
exogenous. The Fed adjusted the rate when
money deviated from target,13 and because
money is one of the endogenous variables in
the model, this practice effectively made the
funds rate endogenous as well. We corrected
for first-order serial correlation where the
autocorrelation coefficient was significant at
the 10-percent level.
The results of estimating the reserves-
market equations and the demand-deposit
multiplier are reported in Table 3 as equations
(3.0 to (3.4). Recall that reserves demand is
viewed as reflecting primarily the behavior of
deposit supply. The latter in turn is regarded asTable 3
Estimated Equations
Equation
(3. 1) InRA~= 3.8 - .360niFI- Inicp t) - .071niBI-I + .23InSCALEt
(9.27)(1.93)' . (1.83) . (4.62)
+ 1.041nrD t - .231nrI t + .53Ut_1




(3.2) InRA~+1/2= 3.1- .51 OniFI - InicPI)
(6.2)(2.6)' ,
-.121niB ,t_1 + .301nSCALEt+ .701nrD,t+112 - .131nrl,t+1I2 +.36Ut_ if1




(3.3) RBt = .008 + .64 (iF.t - iB/ hZl - .54.6.RUt·ZI + .59 RBt_ 1
(0.19) (4.61) (7.44) (6.14)





(3.4) InMULTt = .01 - .075In(LTBt./DBt_ l ) - .04InSCALEI
<0.6) (3. j) (2.6)






(3.5) InDBt - .8InDBI_I = .17 + .66 .6.lnBLt + 1 aj Inicp .
(1.42)(2.16) i=O l-i
6 3 3
- .8 1a;Inicp t-I-i + 1 bjlnYt_ j - .81 bjlnYt_ l_j •
i= 0 ' i= 0 i= 0
where
ao= - .016 0.24)
al = - .015 (2.Q2)
a2 = - .014 (2.75)
a3 = - .012 (2.39)
a4 = - .010 (1.81)
as = - .008 (1.46)
a6 = - .006 (1.22)
1 = - .081 (2.75)




bl = .19 (4.36)
b2= .100.57)
b3 = .02 <0.3I)
1 = .64 (7.47)
32Table 3 (continued)
(3.6) InSBt == .44 +.11 (l!iept) + .BlnYt + .65InSBt_ 1
(3.07)(2.44) , (4.07) 01.03)
.02MMCDUMt - .BBUSDUMt - .02ATSDUMt+ .56Ut.1




(3.7) InSTBt = -0,05 + .160/iCpt) .150/iCpt)MMCDUMt + .l61nY1-,
(.20) (1.54) , (2.63)' (2.52)
+ .77lnSTBt_1 + .03MMCDUMt + .008ATSDUMt + .007SPRDUMt + .19Ut_l





0.8) InCt = - 1.64 + 1 ajlnYt•j+ .87Ut_1
(12.2) i= 0 (11.5)
where
ao= .12 (1.62)
al = .12 (2.95)
a2=.12 (8.07)





as = .09 0.20)
a6 = .07 (2.42)
a7 = .05 (2.01)
ag= .04 (1.75)
1 = .83 (46.34)





0.10) OCDt + .80 + 1.570CDt_ l - .73 OCDt.2 + .12 OCDt•3





t-statistics are in parentheses.
Estimation method is two-stage leastsquareswithCochrane-Orcutt adjustmentwhereindicated bythevariable Ut•l . Instru-
mentalvariables used for iF and icp, Sample period was 1976: Lunar 8 - 1979: Lunar 10. Distributed lags in 0.5) and (3.8)
are second-degree Almon with the tail tied to zero.
33being determined by the aggregate size of
banks' portfolios, measured by SCALE, and
by the fraction financed by nondeposits, which
is a function of icp, iF, and iB• Hence RAd de-
pends on the same variables and is influenced
in the same direction by them. In particular,
higher iF and iB would be expected to lower
RAd, while increases in SCALE and icp would
raise it. Also, increases in the required-reserve
ratios, rD and rj, should raise RAd.
The first two lines report the results for the
two estimates ofreserves demand. Both equa-
tions fit the data quite well. All the estimated
coefficients have the right signs, and all pass a
test of significance at the 95-percent confi-
dence level, except for the coefficients on rl.
Both measures of RAd are relatively elastic
with respect to the funds rate, especially
RAt+l/2, which determines the elasticity of
demand-deposit supply. The RAt measure of
reserves demand should be less responsive to
its arguments than is RAt+l/2' which in fact is
true. The reason is that RAt reflects only a par-
tial response ofdemand deposits to changes in
the funds rate and the other arguments,
because it excludes the requirements against
deposits created in the last half ofthe month.
RAt+l12 on the other hand includes reserves
against all deposits of the current month, and
therefore more accurately measures their
response to interest rates and SCALE.
The two versions of reserve demand adjust
rapidly to their explanatory variables, with full
adjustment occurring in one month. Although
we tried a number ofdistributed-lag specifica-
tions, lagged effects of the explanatory varia-
bles were consistently insignificant. These
findings - rapid speeds of adjustment and
relatively large interest elasticities - are con-
sistent with one ofour central hypotheses: the
supply ofdeposits results from the interaction
of banks and the public in various credit
markets, where participants actively maximize
profits on a day-by-day and hour-by-hour
basis. As noted earlier, this part ofthe model
differs from conventional models, which view
deposit supply as accommodating the public's
demand for deposits. Since many deposit
holders inactively manage their balances, con-
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ventional models produce the result that de-
posits (and thus reserves) respond to interest
rates with long lags and low elasticities.
Next, we present the model's representation
of the supply of total reserves. Under the
funds-rate regime of the estimation period,
total reserves supply is simply equal to banks'
demand for total reserves, Rd. The only
remaining issue concerns what part of this
demand is supplied through borrowed and
what part through nonborrowed reserves. The
estimated member-bank borrowing function is
reported in Table 3 equation (3.3). Its argu-
ments are the square root ofthe differential of
the funds rate over the discount rate (defined
to be zero when thefunds rate is below the dis-
count rate), changes in nonborrowed reserves,
and lagged borrowing. It was observed that,
when the funds rate fell below the discount
rate, member-bank borrowing shrank to a
small frictional amount. Thus, we
hypothesized that banks borrow from the
Federal Reserve primarily when there is suffi-
cient incentive in the form ofa positive funds
rate/discount rate differential. Tests of this
hypothesis were strongly confirmed. As a con-
sequence, we imposed the constraint on the
estimated equation that borrowing responds
only to positive differentials.
We used the square root of the differential
to reflect the increasing administrative pres-
sure and/or reluctance to borrow accompany-
ing a rise in the spread (and therefore in RB).
With the square root, the RB equation has the
property that RB's responsiveness to a given
change in the spread declines as the level of
the spread rises.
We also hypothesized that because oflagged
reserve accounting, changes in nonborrowed
reserves would have a transitory effect on bor-
rowing. Under lagged accounting, required
reserves this week are fixed, being determined
by deposits of two weeks ago. A reduction in
nonborrowed reserves therefore forces banks
in the short-run to replace them with borrowed
reserves, because the total demand for reserves
is unchanged. Thus we should observe a nega-
tive relationship between changes in nonbor-
rowed and borrowed reserves.In..the. borrowing equation, .first,all
explanatory variables have.the expected signs
and are highly significant. Second, thespeedof
adjustment is again relatively fast - the mean
lag is 1.4 lunar months. However, even this
relatively quick adjustment seems surprisingly
slow when compared to the even faster adjust-
ment in the reserves-demand equations noted
earlier. Third, the implied contemporaneous
response ofborrowing to the funds rate is very
large, especially when the spread is very low.
Thus a 10-basis-point rise in the funds rate
increases borrowing by $64 million when the
spreadis 25 basis points. When the spread rises
to 50, 100 or 200 basis points, a lO-basis-point
increase in the funds rate produces $45, $32
and $22 million of additional borrowing,
respectively. The long-run responses are about
21J2 times larger.
To complete the banking side ofthe model,
we need a prediction ofthe supply ofdeposits.
This we obtain by multiplying the equation for
RAt+l12 (equation (3.2» by the estimate of
the multiplier in equation (3.4). The multiplier
is simply a weighted average of the reserve-
requirement ratios on demand deposits and
nondeposit funds. For reasons explained in
Appendix C, large certificates ofdeposit (LTB)
are the only significant reservable "non-
deposit" liability. Hence, the multiplier can be
written as lI(rD + r,(LTB/DB) ). For reasons
discussed above, the ratio LTB/DB is approxi-
mated as a function of its lagged value and
SCALE. Hence we estimated the multiplier as
a function of these two variables and the
required-reserve ratios. The coefficients on
the latter had the correct negative signs. The
coefficient on SCALE was also negative,
indicating perhaps that as banks' portfolios
increased, they raised nondeposit rates to
attract more funds, causing the ratio ofCDs to
demand deposits to rise.
The demand for demand deposits can be
viewed as a disequilibrium process in which
deposit-supply shocks move the public away
from its equilibrium demand. Over the sample
period ofthis study, bank loans were found to
be the major source ofmoney-supply shocks.14
Changes in bank loans therefore can proxy for
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money-supply shocks. Disequilibrium caused
by past shocks is worked offat a rate of (I-p)
per month, so thata fraction p oflast month's
disequilibrium persists into the currentperiod.
At the same time, the fraction X of this
month's shock is held temporarily, and thus
adds to the measure ofcurrent disequilibrium.
Observed deposits therefore can be written,
The short-run equilibrium demand function
for deposits, DBd, is a function of icP and
nominal income (Y) - which determine the
long-run equilibrium dema"nd for deposits -
and lagged values of DBd represent partial
adjustment ofmoney demand in the short-run
to the long-run equilibrium level. Since we
cannot directly observe DBd - it does not
equal DB when there is disequilibrium - we
solve for it in terms of interest rates and
income by successive substitution, Le.,
Substituting this result into (0 and rearrang-
ing we havel5
InDBt = Iai Inicp,t_i - plai Inicp,t_l_i
+ IbiInYt_ i- plbJnYt-1-i
+ plnDBt_ 1+ XlllnBLt (3)
Estimates of the demand-deposit demand
equation are shown in (3.5). The long-run
elasticities on income and the commercial-
paper rate are highly significant, and their
values are in the "normal" range for tradi-
tional money-demand equations. Second, the
change in the bank-loan variable is significant,
with the expected positive sign. Third, the
coefficient on IllnBL is relatively large. For
example, the decline in BL in May 1980 is esti-
mated to have held observed demand deposits
to a I/2-percent growth rate, compared to the
I3-percent growth which would have other-
wise occurred. Fourth, the estimate of p at .8indicates that deposit-market'disequilibrium
induced by bank loans persists with a mean lag
offour months.
Equation (3.8) presents the public'sdemand
for currency as a function of a distributed lag
on nominal GNP. The commercial-paper rate
could theoretically enter this equation, but did
not do so significantly during, the sample
period. The combination of DB and Cd pro-
vides the model with the stock ofMIA.
In order to determine MIB, we must explain
MIA plus total other checkable deposits
(OCD). The latter includes deposits both at
banks and thrifts, although thrift deposits were
relatively small, being confined to NOW
accounts at institutions in Northeastern states.
The major component ofOCD during the sam-
ple period was commercial-bank ATS (auto-
matic transfer from savings) accounts. These
deposits were introduced in November 1978;
hence the growth in OeD represents almost
entirely the public's accumulation of desired
stocks ofATS accounts. This'stock adjustment
in the public's demand was modelled most
effectively as a function of past OCD. (3.10)
The model includes three more demands by
the public for bank liabilities: banks' other
checkable deposits, equation (3.9); small time
deposits, equation (3.7); and passbook savings
deposits, equation 0.6). These variables
enter the model because banks are required to
hold reserves against them. Other checkable
deposits at banks (OCDB), like OCD, is
modelled as a time series. For savings (SB)
and small time deposits (STB) , the public's
demands determine their quantities. The argu-
ments of these functions include personal
income, the commercial-paper rate, and a
number of (dummy) variables capturing the
effects of various regulatory changes during
the sample period (see Appendix Bfor defini-
tions).
Simulation Results
While Table 3 shows how the estimated
equations perform individually, it does not
indicate how well all ofthe model's equations
and identities simultaneously predict the
endogenous variables of the system. Conse-
quently, we made a full-model static simula-
tion of the sample period, using actual values
for lagged dependent variables and applying
autocorrelation corrections to preceding
month's errors. Table 4 presents the results of
this simulation for the four major variables of
the model (MIA, MIB, R, icp).
The model fits the in-sample data for the
monetary and reserve aggregates quite well,
producing root-mean-squared errors (RMSE)
ranging from 0.21 to 0.30 percent of the































'Fe(jer~lI-lUtnds rate exogenous. All exogenous variables setat actual values.
2Nonborrowed reserves exogenous in 1979/Lll-1980/L5, and 1980/LlO-1980/LlI. Federal-funds rate exogenous in 1980/
L6-1980/L9. All exogenous variables set at actual values.
36caloflnoney-marketmodels, the interest-rate
forecasts are less accurate than the monetary
and •reserve-aggregate· forecasts. The RMSE
for the commercial-paper rate is 1.7 percent,
which amounts to 14 basis points.
The right-hand column of Table 4 shows
RMSEs for the same four variables from a
dynamic out-of-sample simulation over 1979/
LII - 1980/L11. In this simulation, lagged de-
pendent variables took on values predicted by
thel110del in previous periods, and serial cor-
relation adjustments were applied only to the
error in the final in-sample ·l11onth. Not
surprisingly, the RMSEs from this experiment
are larger than the in-sampleresuits -- for the
aggregates, they range from 0.45 to 0.60 per-
cent, while for the commercial-paper rate the
RMSE is 15.9 percent. In view ofthe extreme
volatility ofthe post-October 1979 period com-
pared to the earlier estimation period, we may
Figure 5
Out-of-Sample Predictions of
M-tB and the Commercial Paper
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37take the out-of-sample results as a measure of
the model's success.
Even more encouraging is the success ofthe
model at predicting the turning points during
the period. As shown in Figure 5, the model
was able to simulate the rather wild gyrations
ofMIB, whereas a wide variety ofmore tradi-
tional models missed these turning points. 16
The model did not do quite as well on icp,
specifically missing the large drop in 19801L5.
In other months, however, the simulation
tracked reasonably well.
III. Why Were the Aggregates So Volatile in 1980?
Analysis ofthe model's exogenous variables
indicates that changes in bank loans were by
far the most important contributor to MIB's
rapid growth in the first and third quarters of
1980 - and also to its rapid second-quarter
decline. Evidence for this conclusion is pre-
sented in Figure 6, which compares two
dynamic simulations of MIB. The solid line is
a full dynamic simulation - i.e., the same one
shown in Figure 5. The dashed line is asimula-
tion with bank loans constant, but identical in
every other respect to the full simulation. This
experiment indicates that without the post-
1979 volatility in bank loans, MIB would not
have gyrated as it did.
What accounts for the erratic pattern of
bank-loan movements in 1980? The most
plausible explanation is the Special Credit
Control Program of March 1980, which put
binding constraints on bank-credit growth. In
the first quarter of 1980, the financial press
had reported that businesses were anticipating
credit controls. This probably contributed to
the rapid growth of loans in that quarter, as
Dynamic Simulation with
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38firms attempted to obtain bank credit while it
was still available. In the second quarter, loans
declined absolutely in response to the binding
constraints ofthecredit controls. Finally, loans
spurted in the summer period as firms
attempted to make up for the lack ofloans in
the preceding quarter.
IV. Conclusions
Conventional money-market models reflect
the view that the monetary aggregates are
determined primarily by the public's demand
for money. The money-market model pre-
sented in this paper reflects an alternative view
- that the monetary aggregates are deter-
mined in the short run primarily by the supply
of money, which arises out of the behavior of
banks and the public in established financial
markets. Several pieces of evidence support
this hypothesis. First, the money supply res-
ponds to its financial-market determinants
with very short lags, consistent with the typical
speed of adjustment in financial markets, but
.not with the typical sluggishness of money
demand. Second, bank loans can have - and
in 1980, did have - a potent influence on the
monetary aggregates. Third, the market for
money is often characterized by disequilibrium
in the short-run. Money-supply "shocks"
temporarily push the public off its short-run
money-demand curve, which allows the
money supply to exert a large short-run in-
fluence on the stock ofmoney observed in the
economy.
These results have important implications
for Federal Reserve monetary policy. First,
policy makers should pay close attention to
financial-market developments, which can inf-
luence the growth of money in a quick and
potent fashion. Second, policy makers should
be especially careful to evaluate financial-
market developments when signs appear of a
shift in the conventional money-demand func-
tion. A good case in point is the second quarter
of 1980, when conventional models severely
overpredicted the money stock. Evidence of a
downward shift in the money-demand rela-
tionship would imply that money supply
should be allowed to fall commensurately to
avoid an overly expansionary monetary policy.
On the other hand, the model in this paper
explains the decline in money as a supply
shock, induced by the decline in bank loans
that followed from the Special Credit Control
Program of 1980. Such a conclusion implies
that monetary-control efforts should be
directed toward more rapid money-supply
growth to avoid an overly contractionary
policy.
Appendix A
Formal Representation of the Model
The model describes the portfolio behavior
ofthe Federal Reserve, commercial banks and
the nonbank public over monthly observa-
tions. The balance sheets ofcommercial banks
and the nonbank public are shown below. See















CThe Federal R~serve is assumed to control
RU = R - RB and iB, making them
exogenous. In addition, the model takes as
exogenous BL and Y. BL is exogenous because
the public's demand for loans is unresponsive
to the contemporaneous (monthly) loan rate,
while Y is exogenous because the lag between
monetary policy and Y is greater than one
month. In addition, individual banks take de-
posits (DB and TB) as determined entirely by
the public's demand for deposits. Since the
yields banks pay on these assets are legally
held below market-clearing levels, individual
banks will supply any quantity demanded by
the public. Finally, it is assumed that any
quantity of currency demanded by the public
will be supplied. Given these assumptions and
the profit-maximizing behavior described in
Section I of the text, the following structural
model may be specified.
IMBS = IMBS00, iF, iB, BL - DB - TB + R) (J)
IMBd = IMBd 00 , iF, icr, Y) (2)
FF/Rps = FF' 00 , iF, iB, BL - DB - TB + R) (3)
FF/Rpd = FFd00 , iF, icp, Y) (4)
RBd = RB OF, iB) (5)
OAd 00, iF, icp, Y) - OLsOo, iF, icp, Y) = 0 (6)
DBd = DBdOcP, Y) (7)
DB - DBd = DBSH (~DBS) (8)
TEd = TBd 00, iF, icr, Y) (9)
Cd = Cd 00, iF, icr, Y) (I0)
Rd - RBd = RDs (II)
Rd = rDDB (I2)
NW = DB + TB - DBG - BL + C + 1MB
+ FF/RP+ OA - OL (13)
Only twelve of these thirteen equations are
independent, and thus anyone ofthem can be
dropped from the solution of the model's
reduced form. We chose to drop equation 6.
The remaining twelve equations can be solved
for the following twelve unknowns: 1MB, FF/
RP, DB, DBd, TB, C, R, RB, NW, io, iF, icp.
In Section I ofthe text, the model is solved
in three stages as follows. In Stage 1, equations
1,2,3,4,5and 12 are solved for 1MB, FF/RP,
RB, io, DB and R as functions ofiF, icp, iB, (BL
- TB), Y and other variables. The sum ofthe
equations for 1MB, FF/RB, and RB provides
the EQ equation ofthe text. The equations for
DB and R are the Stage 1 deposit-supply and
reserves-demand equations.
In Stage 2, equation 11 is added to the Stage
1equations, to provide solutions for 1MB, FF/
RP, RB, io, DB, R and iF, as functions of icp,
and iB, (BL - TB), Y and other variables. The
equation for DB is the Stage 2 deposit-supply
equation.
In Stage 3, equations 7 and 8 are added to
the Stage 2 equations, providing solutions for
1MB, FF/RP, RB,io, DB, R, iF, and DBdand
icp, as functions ofiB, (BL - TB) l Y and other
variables. Finally, the model can be completed
by using equations 9, 10, and 13 to provide









Dummy variable for the introduction of ATS accounts at commercial banks:
Inl, In2, In3, ... , In13, during 1978/Lll-1979/LlO.
Dummy variable for the introduction of business and state-and-Iocal govern-
ment saving deposits at banks: In20, In21, In22, ... , In26, during 1976/L7-
1976/Ll2, and In26 during 1976/Ll3-1979ILIO.
Currency in the hands of the public
Private demand deposits at commercial banks.
U.S. Treasury demand deposits at commercial banks.
Institutional changes affecting the public's demand for SB and STB; includes

































Net federal funds purchased plus security repurchase agreements at commer-
cial banks.
Total nondeposit funds plus time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or
more, less total holdings ofsecurities at commercial banks, less FFIRP.
Time deposits in denominations of$100,000 or more.
Federal Reserve discount rate.
Three-monthnonfinancial commercial-paper rate.
Federal-funds rate.
Ninety-day large negotiable certificate-of-deposit rate.
Passbook-savings rate at commercial banks.
Total loans at commercial banks.
Dummy variable for the introduction ofsix-month money market certificates
at commercial banks: 1 during 1978/L7-1979/L10; 0 elsewhere.
C + DB + OCD.
DB/RAt+l12
Net worth ofthe nonbank public = DB + TB DBG - BL + C + 1MB +
FF/RP + OA - OL.
Other checkable deposits at commercial banks and thrift institutions.
Other checkable deposits at commercial banks.
Other assets ofthe nonbank public.
Other liabilities of the nonbank public.
Total member-bank reserves, adjusted for Regulations D and M.
Reserve requirements against demand deposits and managed liabilities,
adjusted for Regulations D and M.
Borrowed reserves from the Federal Reserve.
Member bank excess reserves.
Member bank required reserves, adjusted for Regulations D and M.
Member bank nonborrowed reserves, adjusted for Regulations D and M.
Reserve-requirement ratio against demand deposits.
Reserve-requirement ratio against time deposits in denominations of$100,000
or more.
Reserve-requirement ratio against 1MB.
Reserve-requirement ratio against SB, STB and OCDB.
Passbook-savings deposits at commercial banks.
1MB + FF/RP + RB + DB - RA = BL TB + (R-RA).
Dummy variable for the elimination of the 25-basis-point spread between
yields on money-market certificates at thrift institutions over commercial
banks: 1n1, 1n2, ... , 1n7 during 1979/L4-1979/LlO.
Time deposits in denominations ofless than $100,000 at commercial banks.
Other deposits = DBG + OCDB + SB + STB.
Personal income in current dollars.




The theoretical model focuses on the way
that portfolio decisions ofbanks and the public
affect the stock of demand deposits, and
through them, the demand for reserves. In
reality, other items besides demand deposits
are reservable. Small time and savings deposits
(SB and STB), government deposits (DBG),
other checkable deposits (OCDB), and certain
nondeposits also have reserve requirements,
and therefore affect the amount of required
reserves. 17 In addition, required reserves con-
tain the reserves that thrift institutions must
hold (RTH) with the phasing in ofthe univer-
sal reserve requirements mandated by the
Monetary Control Act. 18 And finally,
measured reserves also include the small
amount of excess reserves (RE) that banks
hold.
The behavioral relationship underlying
reserves demand is framed in terms ofdemand
deposits and nondeposit liabilities only. Hence
the other components ofreserve requirements
must first be stripped away before reserves
demand can be estimated. This refined version
is called adjusted reserves, RA; its relation to
total reserves, R, is shown in the reserves
identity (equation 2.13 ofTable 2 in the text.)
The other components of total reserves
must still be accounted for. This is done in two
ways. Excess reserves and requirements
against thrift deposits and Treasury deposits
are treated as constants over the sample period
(equations 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18), since they
are small and exhibit only slight variation. The
others are treated by estimating the quantities
of corresponding deposits and multiplying
them by the appropriate reserve ratio. For
small time and savings deposits, the public's
demands are viewed as determining their
quantities, because the banks' scope for alter-
ing rates is constrained by interest-rate ceil-
ings. Thus the public's demands for SB and
STB are estimated as functions of interest
rates, income, and a number of variables
representing institutional changes
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(DUM(.)).19 The resulting estimates are
multiplied by the corresponding reserve ratio
to predict the amount of reserves held against
them. Estimates of the public's demand for
other checkable deposits at banks (equation
2.9) are used in the same way to estimate the
reserves held against them.
Recognizing that both demand deposits and
some non-deposit liabilities are reservable
makes the analysis ofthe multiplier somewhat
more complicated than our theoretical discus-
sion would indicate. In that discussion, we
could think of demand deposits alone as hav-
ing reserve requirements, which meant that
the multiplier - the ratio of demand deposits
to reserves - was simply the reciprocal of the
demand-deposit required-reserve ratio, rD'
With managed funds also reservable, we must
also take account of the fact that part of RA
will not be available to support demand de-
posits. The larger the amount of reserves
absorbed in requirements against nondeposit
liabilities, the smaller will be the amount of
demand deposits outstanding per doilar ofRA,
i.e. the smaller will be the multiplier.
Not all nondeposit liabilities are reservable.
For all intents and purposes, large time de-
posits (LTB) are the only significant ones that
are. This is because the model uses a reserve
series that abstracts from changes in Regula-
tions D and M, which define reserve require-
ments. That is, the measure removes discon-
tinuities in the reserves numbers caused by
changes in required-reserve ratios. Ifa liability
item has incurred reserve requirements only
part of the time, its reserves will not show up
in the smoothed series because its benchmark
ratio is zero. Most reserve requirements on
nondeposits have been on-again, off-again (on
Eurodollar borrowing, for example) and
therefore are not included in our reserve
series. The important exception is reserves
against LTB, which are included because these
large CDs have always been covered by
reserve requirements.Hence our adjusted reserves series, RA, is
essentially composed of required reserves
against demand deposits and large time de-
posits. The multiplier therefore depends not
only on r D but as well on LTB (relative to DB)
and its reserve ratio, rl' In the empirical model,
the multiplier is estimated as a function of
these variables.
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